There appears to be a new phantom force at work in Africa.
A deadly new mercenary company, comprising old-timers from South Africa’s border battles during the Cold War, has apparently given the radical Muslim terrorists of Boko Haram a bloody nose in recent covert missions.

Operating in the desert wastelands of northern Nigeria, Boko Haram hit the world headlines big time when it kidnapped over 200 schoolgirls from the town of Chibok in 2014.

Despite some assistance to find the girls from the British and American military, there were no good results to help the incumbent president Goodluck Jonathan win his looming national election.

He faced much criticism and his own dispirited Nigerian army appeared to have little competence, and even less appetite, for a scrap with the Boko Haram bandits, whose reign of terror had run unopposed for some six years.

In desperation, Goodluck turned to a South African outfit with the catchy acronym of STEP (actually STTEP for Specialised Tasks, Training Equipment & Protection). There is a subtle but important difference between ‘mercenaries’ and ‘contract soldiers’. STEP appear to be the latter, paid by a legitimate government to train and assist for the greater good, as opposed to mercenaries will kill their own grandmothers for the coins on their eyes. That’s the theory.

STEP is headed by a Colonel Eeben Barlow, 62, a former South African Defence Force commander who runs a group of bush warfare experts that cut their teeth in the border wars of 30 years ago.

Barlow was formerly a co-founder of Executive Outcomes, which in 1995 helped the government of Sierra Leone to defend itself successfully against the limb-chopping Revolutionary United Front.

In January of this year, Col. Barlow recruited a task force in top secret to assist the Nigerian government and hit the Boko Haram where it hurt. He found an aging ‘Dad’s Army’ of former South African soldiers who still retained that country’s continuing wild frontier spirit.

They comprised a force of some hundred men, including ex-members of apartheid-era SA security forces and former elite black troops from both South African and opposing communist guerrilla units. Their steady confidence and experience under fire paid off.

This rainbow band of brothers, backed with its own small helicopter fleet, hit the Boko Haram terrorists hard, causing them to flee and freeing hundreds of captured women being held as sex slaves and bush wives. The campaign was relentless in its momentum, says Barlow, which was designed to push Boko Haram onto its back foot.

‘It was not uncommon for us to be met by thousands of cheering locals once the enemy had been driven out.’

The secret of STEP’s success was its policy of ‘relentless pursuit’ (a similar principle to NATO Special Forces’ Black Ops in Iraq), which mirrored Boko Haram’s own non-stop hit-and-run tactics.

Once the terrorist fighters were on the run, STEP forces would be helicoptered ahead to cut off all escape routes.

Expert bush trackers were used (see Terence Strong’s thriller ROGUE ELEMENT for further understanding of these specialist techniques) to learn about the enemy, where the fighters were heading, and the location of their secret camps.

STEP’s helicopter unit was notified of ‘kill blocks’ to the fore and flanks of its advancing ground strike force. The whole operation also assisted the regular Nigerian army with intelligence gathering, troop transportation and casualty evacuation.

Although it has been claimed that Boko Haram has virtually been wiped out in the relentless three month campaign, it is unclear whether or not it will be able to regroup and whether Nigeria’s new President, ex-general Muhammadu Buhari, will continue STEP’s contract.

Others have suggested that outfits like STEP could be appropriately and effectively used against Daesh (ISIL) on the Syrian/Iraqi borders or in Libya.

Never say never.

For over the past 10 years Vladimir Putin – as both Prime Minister and President of Russia – has overseen a huge modernisation and upgrading of its armed forces, including submarines and aircraft.
The latest is the new T-14 Armata main battle tank (MBT), proposed variants of which were shown off at the recent Victory Day Parade in Moscow.
Some think that main battle tanks (MBTs) are no longer king of the battlefield. That attack helicopters and infantry-fired missiles now reign supreme. But the truth is the technology balance swings almost each decade one way or the other – or seems to have done during my lifetime and before.
Apparently this new Russian beast sports a 125mm smoothbore cannon and remote-controlled 7.62mm machine gun, active mine counter-measures and a suite of camera offering 360-degrees vision. It travels at up to 50mph, firing on the hoof.
The crew of three live in a protected armoured pod in the front, presumably hence the need for remote HMG and cameras.
It has been suggested in some defence quarters that the Russians may actually be able to deliver in the T-14 a tank that is of greater speed, manoeuvrability, firepower and survivability than anything comparable in NATO armies.

France and Germany have responded by announcing that they are to co-operate in developing a successor to the highly-regarded, but aging German-made Leopard 2 MBT. This is scheduled to be replaced by 2030. However, it looks as though the Russian Armata will be battle-ready a long time before that.

[Any tankies (or anti-tankies) out there want to post on this? Terence Strong]

 The “Head Shed” at 22 Special Air Service Regiment has been straining at the leash for some time to have a serious crack at the Da-esh, the barbaric religious cult that pretentiously calls itself “Islamic State”.

Ever since the chemical weapons threat was at its height in Syria, SAS planners have made contingencies for various missions that were eventually to be vetoed Cabinet level due to the high risks involved.

Nevertheless the “Head Shed” has continued to press for a more proactive rather than reactive rôle against the Islamic terrorist force.

Following the so-called Tunisian “beach massacre” last week, it appears that British Prime Minister David Cameron has sanctioned the formation of a dedicated SAS task force of between 60 and 100 members (probably one Sabre Squadron plus full support elements) to target Da-esh operations across Syria, Iraq and north Africa. They would operate in conjunction with US Navy Seal teams and Delta Force commandoes.

The new task force will be run from joint forces HQ in London’s Northwood which will co-ordinate SAS troops’ specialist “target evaluation” techniques and their provision of co-ordinates for Reaper drone attacks against the Da-esh forces and its leadership in particular.

MI6 (the Secret Intelligence Service) is running a considerable network of agents within various jihadist movements and will be able to supply the SAS operations with considerable and precise target intelligence.

 What’s in a name?

Quite a lot, actually. Ask any brand manager. Like the one who famously decided that you’re “never alone” with a Strand cigarette actually left you utterly alone and possibly suicidal beside the Thames. Or the Pinto car that suggested all of its South American drivers had a small penis.

The Kharij (or Khawarij) was an extreme Islamic sect that emerged shortly after the Prophet Muhammad’s death during the Battle of Siffin in the 7th century, near the Syrian-Iraqi border.

That battle was waged between the forces of the fourth caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib and the Muslim governor of Syria.

The sect initially supported Ali’s camp but denounced leaders of both sides for even agreeing to arbitration to end the hostilities. It believed that any form of negotiation was tantamount to tolerating aberrations of the faith as they interpreted it.

Several thousand Kharij broke away and settled around Kufa in Iraq. Ali ibn Abi Talib sent a representative to persuade them to return to the fold. A few did but the majority insisted that their interpretation of the Koran was the only true and correct one.

In their view, any Muslim who did not agree with them was deemed a heretic who could be put to the sword without mercy.

The Kharij itself has dwindled into obscurity today, but many have pointed out that its radical heritage has been adopted and refashioned by the modern day Islamic State, as it has the pretension to call itself.

Now of late, the British Prime Minister David Cameron has suggested that the UK media should refrain from calling this movement by its chosen name, and instead refer to it as DA-ESH which is a loose Arabic acronym of al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham (Islamic State of Iraq & the Levant).

The selection of the term Da-esh was first selected by the Arabic and Iranian media,
which was hostile to the general extreme jihadist movement , because it excluded both terms Islamic and State.

Therefore the term is roundly loathed by that extreme religious sect in itself, in the same way that members of the German National Socialist Party during World War Two hated the Nationalsozialismus acronym of Nazis. Especially the way that Winston Churchill pronounced it.

I find that I rarely agree with any major decisions that David Cameron makes, but in pure international PR (interpreted here as ‘communications with the masses) terms, he has a point.

He and others claim that Da-esh is not “Islamic”. Well, unfortunately it is. It is not the modern, secular and sane Islam accepted in Tunisia, Turkey and Jordan, for example, and what the West generally would consider to be ‘civilised society’.

But it is a primitive, medieval and unforgiving religious culture that was once similarly seen within Christian history, when anyone who didn’t agree with the Church’s own narrow view of God (or Allah) was for the chop.

Neither is Da-esh a “State” – in any way, shape or form. It’s a bunch of murderous brigands who have hi-jacked a religion for control and power (and ultimately wealth) over others, namely its brain-washed, poorly educated minions, most of whom cannot even read the Qu’ran, let alone begin to understand it.

It expands naturally into any geographical or political area where a failed state leaves a vacuum that needs to be filled. It’s not God or Allah but the natural order of things. There is no legitimacy, only coercion by terror.

So, for once, let’s follow Cameron’s lead and refer in the media throughout the world to that bunch of murderous, inhumane terrorists as the sick religious cult that it actually is, the Da-esh.

Contributed by

Starkey Ward​

(N D MacCartan-Ward DSC AFC

Commander RN)​

AirAsia Flight 8501 was at about 38,000 feet when the pilots reportedly asked to be allowed to climb over “bad weather” – which to all intents and purposes meant over a thunder-head.

Thunder-heads in the tropics may rise up to 50,000 feet or more (because the ‘tropopause’ which limits heights of cloud development is much higher in the tropics than, for example, over Britain where it normally lies at about 40,000 feet).

Therefore, “climbing over” such a thunderhead was not a realistic possibility – going round the thunderhead was the only real option.  It appears that this was not understood by the pilots.

Having entered the thunderhead it is most probable that the aircraft entered a massive downdraught which was represented itself to the pilots as a major and rapid loss in height.

It is most probable that the pilots, having observed the rapid loss in height, immediately attempted to regain height by raising the nose and climbing. It is also most probable that the pilots ignored the cockpit instrumentation which indicated that the aircraft had indeed been in straight and level flight.

In other words the whole of the air mass in the centre of the thunderhead was being sucked down and the aircraft with it – as in a self-contained environment.

The pilots should have maintained straight and level flight and waited for the downward momentum of the air mass to stop (which it would have done…well above the sea/the land).

Instead, it is likely that they misinterpreted what was happening, raise the nose of the aircraft inordinately – rapidly sacrificed airspeed – and stalled.

From there, the rest is history, sadly.

I have been in the same situation as a naval fighter pilot flying in inclement weather. When under training, my instructor (Flight Lieutenant Michael Merritt) and I entered a major thunder-head over the Yorkshire Moors. He instructed me to ignore the height loss and to concentrate on keeping the aircraft straight and level. We entered the thunderhead at about 18,000 feet and finally emerge from the cloud at 4000 feet – “older and wiser”.

Unfortunately, it would appear that the pilots of Flight 8501 did not have such experience to call upon. And if the aircraft Black Boxes confirm what I have written above, then perhaps airline simulator training should be amended to contain such learning experiences.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

WORLD EXCLUSIVE:  This Blog hosts the second SHOCK REPORT from outspoken Falklands War naval air ace STARKEY WARD.

You can only read here IN FULL about our new Aircraft Carriers what the Defence Secretary, the MOD and the RAF don’t want you to know.

Dear Secretary of State and Colleagues,

Further to my recent email and paper on the “UK response to ISIS Threat”, I now have pleasure in forwarding an educational paper on the Extreme Flight Safety Hazard that will be represented by the F-35B STOVL aircraft attempting to do Ship Rolling Vertical Landings on board Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers in all weathers by day and night.

This planned rolling vertical landing procedure will either result in major limitations on the amount of operational flying that can be conducted (additional to the constraints resulting from a ramp fitted deck with no catapult and trap) or, conversely, in major loss of life and equipment – or both.

A major change in course is necessary if our new carriers are to achieve the potential required of them by our national security and defence interests.

With kind regards,

Sharkey

 F-35B STOVL Carrier Deck Landing – An Extreme Flight Safety Hazard in its own right: to Life and Limb and Equipment

By Commander Sharkey Ward DSC AFC:  One of the only living British military aviators with extensive experience of both Conventional carrier and Harrier carrier deck landings and operations in all weather by day and by night.

Executive Summary

The F-35 STOVL aircraft already has insufficient power for it to be able to land vertically on Britain’s new Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers in hot/foul weather conditions when carrying expensive stores.

As the aircraft ages, its power/weight ratio will further decrease.

The MoD answer to this most serious problem is for the aircraft to conduct Ship Rolling Vertical Landings (SRVL) instead of Vertical Landings (VL) on board.

In very wet bad weather with serious ship movement in all axes (yaw, roll, pitch and heave), the STOVL aircraft will have very little braking efficiency and much reduced directional control during an SRVL – a recipe for a catastrophic crash on deck or loss of the aircraft overboard.

This paper explains how this is a recipe for disaster and why a change of course away from this aircraft type is essential if we are to avoid loss of life and our new carriers are to achieve any 24/7 strike carrier capability at all.

In poor weather and heavy seas the SRVL can only be described as a most severe and unacceptable Flight Safety Hazard. It will cause the loss of men and machines. People will die and it is ludicrous to suggest it can work as an acceptable procedure.

Introduction

 For the new British Queen Elizabeth class strike carriers to be effective weapon systems in peace, tension or war, their embarked fighter combat aircraft must be able to operate in all weathers by day and night on a 24/7 basis. The old Ark Royal and modern conventional U.S. Navy strike carriers had/have this capability. Britain’s Invincible Class Harrier carriers also demonstrated this capability remarkably well in the Falklands war, 1982.

Unfortunately, we now have the extraordinary situation where a new fighter aircraft is to be embarked in British carriers but this aircraft will not be able to operate in all weathers by day and night on a 24/7 basis. Far from it: in hot/foul weather and/or high sea states it may not be able to operate from the deck at all.

This short paper examines the facts surrounding this appalling state of affairs – that has been created by Ministers listening blindly to the wrong “Messenger”.

Background

It appears certain that our Ministers ignored any representations made to them on the choice of aircraft by the Naval Staff and successive First Sea Lords. Instead, the “Messenger” that Ministers listened to was that of the Royal Air Force (the loudest voice in the Ministry of Defence) who had almost as little carrier operating experience as the Ministers themselves.

It was therefore a clear case of “the blind leading the blind” – and at considerable probable cost to Britain’s future global security and prosperity.

 What our Ministers did not realise (because the Royal Air Force conveniently evaded the subject) is that fixed wing deck landing operations are complex and are governed by the elements and deck configuration as much as the capability of the pilot and/or a computer in the cockpit.

Decades of Naval Service experience of Conventional carrier operations as well as Harrier carrier operations have produced vital hands-on expertise and standard operating procedures which, if not followed precisely, can and will result in fatal accidents on deck.

Conventional Take Off and Landing (CTOL)

All weather, carrier borne, fixed wing combat aircraft have been able to operate safely from and to our carrier decks for many decades. Prior to the introduction of the Sea Harrier to naval service all such combat aircraft needed catapult assistance for take-off and arrestor gear for landing.

An angled deck was employed for recovery in order to allow aircraft that failed to catch an arrestor wire to “go round again”. The approach airspeed for such Conventional Take Off and Landing (CTOL) fighter aircraft is approximately 135 kn – which, when the wind over the deck of the carrier is taken into account*, equates to an approach speed relative to the ship of up to 110 kn.

*The carrier steams into the wind to create this wind over the deck.

Vertical and Short Take Off and Landing (VSTOL)

With the Sea Harrier came the ability for the carrier borne aircraft to hover over the deck and then land vertically (in similar fashion to a helicopter). This obviated the need for catapults and arrestor gear (Cat and Trap) and, importantly, did not require the carrier to steam into the wind to generate wind over the deck for the landing. This latter conveyed upon the carrier considerable extra versatility during combat operations or in confined/pilotage waters.

On the downside was the fact that in hot climates (and also with usage/age) available engine power decreased and there was not enough power for the aircraft to land vertically on the deck when carrying expensive ordnance/weaponry – or, indeed, a sensible reserve fuel load.  This is the ‘quoted reason’ why the Sea Harrier was withdrawn from service in untimely fashion.

Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL)

A new acronym, “STOVL”, describes the specified launch and landing procedures that were supposed to be the hallmark of the new fighter aircraft destined for our Queen Elizabeth class carriers.

The carrier-borne F-35B STOVL aircraft has not yet completed development and yet it already suffers from severe weight problems. MOD/DSTL analysis has already demonstrated that, like the Sea Harrier at the end of its service, the F-35B has insufficient engine power (even before it enters service) to allow it to Vertical Land (VL) in warm climates when carrying expensive weapons/stores.

In other words and from square one, the term ‘STOVL’ is a misnomer for the aircraft and our new carriers will not benefit from the considerable extra versatility that would be realised with a full, all weather Vertical Landing capability.

Vertical Landing was the principal and only advantage that the F-35B aircraft had over other aircraft options for the Queen Elizabeth air group. Indeed the F-35B suffers many disadvantages (both operational and fiscal) compared with other CTOL options.

But instead of using common sense and disqualifying the aircraft as a viable strike carrier option because of its lack of engine power, the UK Ministry of Defence decided to adopt an entirely new and untried form of deck landing for the aircraft which supposedly would allow it to return on board at greater weight.

This untried/unproven form of deck landing is known as the Ship Rolling Vertical Landing (SRVL).

Instead of hovering, the aircraft would now maintain a steady forward speed relative to the landing point on deck so that the airflow over the wing provided extra lift to supplement the deficient engine power. Even this acronym is a misnomer: SRVL should read SRL because the vertical component has been removed.

The Ship Rolling Vertical Landing (SRVL)

On land, the Harrier Rolling Vertical Landing (RVL) was used for short air strips and required the pilot to fly a 6° glideslope at 50 kts groundspeed down to touch down. A steeper glideslope made it difficult for the pilot to see the touchdown point under the aircraft nose.

It is likely that the same difficulty will be appreciated in the F-35B. However and unlike the land based RVL, for an SRVL the carrier will have to be steaming into wind to generate wind over the deck. 

This raises considerable deck landing and flight safety considerations that appear not have been properly recognised/understood by “The Messenger”, by MoD, by Ministers or by the Naval Staff.

Deficiency in Engine Power Can Only Become Worse

As already intimated and in addition to high-temperature/low thrust considerations, the amount of extra lift required from the SRVL will steadily increase during the life of the aircraft as:

1. engine thrust decreases with age and
2. aircraft weight increases with in-service modifications/repairs.

The SRVL speed of the aircraft relative to the deck will therefore have to increase making it more dangerous.

Aircraft Speed over the Deck

In low wind/light and variable wind conditions our carriers will only be able to guarantee a wind over the deck of approximately 25 kn (induced by its speed through the water). The F-35B is not as aerodynamically efficient as most of its modern counterparts owing to the unique aircraft configuration – meaning that more speed through the air will be required for a set amount of generated lift.

As the aircraft ages, it is therefore probable that to enable a safe landing with adequate power margins the aircraft will be required to maintain a forward speed relative to the deck of no less than 35 kn – giving an airflow over the wing of 60 kn. This 35 kn touchdown speed will need to increase in very high temperatures, with relatively old engines and/or with basic airframe weight increases. Otherwise the aircraft will not be able to land on board.

But it is not just the speed of touchdown on the deck that can contribute to deck landing problems/hazards. The issues are manifold and the major ones are discussed immediately below.

Intended Touchdown Point on Deck

This must be defined taking into account:

1. The position of any new deck landing sight.
2. The movement of the ship in high sea states/foul weather.
3. The assistance given to the pilot by any new stabilised deck landing sight.
4. The amount of braking distance required to bring the aircraft to a halt before it runs out of deck – especially in wet weather.
5. The point of no return.

These factors are interrelated and together will define whether a safe SRVL is possible under prevalent environmental conditions.

As with all fixed wing conventional deck landings on board, the flight parameters of the aircraft on the SRVL approach will have to be carefully controlled if the aircraft is to touch down precisely at the intended point on deck.

A defined glideslope will need to be adhered to and air speed must be kept at a defined constant (e.g. 60 kn). A deck landing sight would provide the pilot with necessary glideslope information and this landing sight must be positioned at the desired point of touchdown.

In flat calm conditions, it may be possible for the SRVL to be conducted safely by the “advanced flight control computers”. (Even that is not yet certain.) However, with serious ship motion in heavy seas and a wet, slippery flight deck (over which the flight control computers will have no control whatsoever) the SRVL will remain an Extreme Flight Safety Hazard.  

By comparison, the Harrier vertical landing on deck was an easier, much more failsafe evolution than the SRVL in bad conditions. 

Our engineers have already claimed technical solutions to various F-35B STOVL problems but many of these claims have proven to be nothing more than wishful thinking, e.g. maintainability of the stealth qualities of the aircraft in the embarked environment; “excellent braking qualities on deck” when de facto the STOVL aircraft’s braking system has been reduced in capability to save weight; etc.

Assurances about SRVL need therefore to be questioned.

In the most difficult conditions, the carrier will be pitching, rolling, yawing and heaving. The point on deck where pitching and yawing have least effect is amidships and this therefore represents the most stable/safest target touchdown point for a SRVL (450 feet from the bow).

This, therefore, is where the deck-landing sight should be positioned. (If the landing site was positioned near to the stern of the ship, it would move up and down with the pitch of the ship – 2° of pitch in the Queen Elizabeth translates to the stern moving up and down 30 feet; which would make the sight totally unusable and the SRVL impossible.)

There will still be ship movement that can be disorientating to the pilot and that can result in an actual touchdown point that is some distance from the intended touchdown point.

For example with ship heave of up to 20 feet (the ship and the landing site bodily moving up and down vertically with sea movement) and using a 6 degree approach angle, this will mean the pilot could land up to 190 feet further down the deck. (20 / tan 6).  This would leave a braking distance of only 260 feet before the end of the deck.

The ability of a 14 ton, tricycle undercarriage aircraft (with just three narrow wheels) to brake to a halt on a moving, wet, slippery deck from 35 kn (40 miles an hour) in less than 260 feet must be considered marginal at best – impossible at worst.

Braking capability is reduced further when the ship pitches and/or heaves downwards at or after the moment of touchdown.  Essentially the weight of the aircraft is less on the deck, meaning that less braking force can be applied before a skid is induced – the layman will understand this by the feeling that you experience when on a ferry and the floor seems to fall away from you as the ship pitches, or when you are in a lift and it starts to descend.  

If the deck is wet this leads to an even lower coefficient of friction – even more braking distance being required.

Aircraft nose wheel steering authority is limited but will need to be applied to counter the rolling motion of the ship (to stop the aircraft sliding over the side or into the ship’s superstructure): so differential braking from each main gear must also be applied. This again reduces the max braking force available.

The erosion of braking distance available through necessary deck-landing site positioning, ship movement, wet weather and, of course, pilot error has been further exacerbated by the designed reduction in F-35B braking capability resulting from the braking system being made lighter as a weight saving measure – to enable vertical landings (which it can no longer do).

The Point of No Return

In poor weather and/or in hot weather there is therefore no doubt/no question that only up to half the carrier’s flight deck will be available for aircraft braking after touching down from a SRVL. And it is clear from the above that perhaps only 260 feet of the flight deck may be available for such braking. 

This is a dire circumstance which will demand clear decision-making by the pilot and indeed by the command (whether flying operations are possible or not). The odds are already well set against a safe recovery on board by day and these odds are exponentially increased by night particularly if the landing aircraft only has enough fuel remaining for one single approach to the deck.

In such circumstances and with three or four aircraft airborne returning from a mission for recovery, it is difficult to see how all these craft could be recovered safely without a considerable reduction in mission range/endurance. (The second and subsequent aircraft to land would have to wait until the aircraft ahead has been secured to a flight deck tractor and moved safely out of the way.)

 On deck, each pilot will have to make a split-second decision and decide whether he is going to be able to stop safely or whether he will have to eject before sliding over the side or crashing into superstructure or other aircraft parked on deck.

Discussion

All of the above sounds bad enough by day in a rough sea.  Now put that into a night scenario, with low cloud and rain too.  Recovering at max landing weights (limited by the available engine power) with unspent stores from a combat mission, perhaps with a cloud base of 200 feet (standard instrument minima) and one has a very ugly situation.  With insufficient power available in the F-35B, it is clearly not an acceptable answer to adopt the Ship Rolling Vertical Landing for recovery on board.  

Admirals and Air Marshals who have little or no fixed wing carrier operational experience/expertise may misguidedly suggest that “we can make it work” or “we have to make it work”. 

That is ‘head in the sand’, wishful thinking at its worst. If the Prime Minister, Secretary of State and colleagues are serious about our national security and power projection capability in defence of our trade routes and energy supplies, they will take note of this expert opinion and configure our new carriers with ‘cat and trap’ and a fully capable fighter aircraft such as the F-35C or, even better, the F-18 Super Hornet family of aircraft.

Unacceptable Flight Safety Hazard

1.  In poor weather and heavy seas the F-35B STOVL SRVL can only be described as a most severe and unacceptable Flight Safety Hazard. It will cause the loss of men and machines. People will die and it is ludicrous to suggest it can work as an acceptable 24/7 deck landing procedure.

 2.  Unless a change in course is made (away from this aircraft and flight deck configuration) preferably at the coming Defence and Security Review, 2015, the Queen Elizabeth class carriers will become a laughingstock with little if any true Strike capability and just a marginal amphibious close air support capability.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

An equally tough response to Sharkey Ward’s open letter to the UK Defence Secretary comes from JOHN KEENAN.
Now semi-retired, John’s service career spanned 24 years in the Royal Naval Fleet Air Arm. He served aboard no less than six aircraft carriers before leaving the military as a Chief Petty Officer, Aircraft Engineering Artificer.

Since then he has worked in the UK, Europe, New Zealand and BAe Saudi Arabia as a senior fleet engineer and aircraft project manager.

Another ‘shot’ from Sharkey – he is, of course, spot on.
The Tornados do not have the legs to provide cover for the drops (I have worked on both variants of the Tornado as a Superintendent with BAe in Saudi).

There is also no mention of the ‘all singing and dancing’ Typhoon! They would require a flight-refuelling tanker aircraft – no mention of that either.
It all goes to prove without doubt the need for a carrier aircraft with ‘legs’ and in-flight refuelling capability – something the planned F35B does not have – and a tacit admission that the Typhoon cannot ‘hack it’ either.

RAF deceit and its lies to politicians in the past – who collectively could not victual a vulture in an abattoir when it comes to naval aviation – are now fully exposed.

Why has the US not asking for Britain’s help in air strikes in northern Iraq. Almost certainly it is because the RAF simply does not have the immediate capability without massive logistical support, including in-flight refuelling tankers.

Other recent RAF requirements appear to be 5-star hotel accommodation with swimming pools, saunas and gyms on full expenses down to the Group Captain’s toilet cleaner.

Cheers,
John

My blog is privileged to carry a copy of an open letter to Britain’s Secretary of Defence from former Royal Navy air ace and squadron commander of the Falklands War, the hard-hitting SHARKEY WARD.
It is no secret that both the Fleet Air Arm and Army Air Corps are aware of the RAF’s current efforts to impose its influence and involvement in all branches of military aviation.

Open letter (re-edited) to:

Rt Hon Michael Fallon MP, Secretary of State for Defence
Rory Stewart MP
Penny Mordaunt MP
Rt Hon George Osborne MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer
Vernon Coaker MP
Margaret Hodge MP

Dear Secretary of State for Defence

I trust that you are aware that you are being surrounded by deliberately misleading advice concerning humanitarian air drops by the Royal Air Force over Iraq and fighter attack aviation ‘advice’ that verges on the self-delusion of Walter Mitty himself.

Media articles have suggested that the RAF aborted the dropping of life-saving aid on the mountain in Iraq because “It was afraid of hitting the recipients of that aid”.

This is the pure and deliberate creation of confusion – often classed more graphically, in frontline Royal Navy jargon, as “blowing smoke up someone’s arse”.

The United States can deliver such airborne aid on a nightly basis. So why is the RAF unable to do so?

Could it be an unwillingness to get anywhere near possible enemy fire, as with the “weapons-tight fiasco” forced on the carrier battle group during the Vulcan bombing raids during the Falklands War?

I know, because I was airborne providing fighter air-defence cover for each Vulcan raid.

I mention Walter Mitty because of the suggestion that our obsolete Tornados could be used effectively against Islamic State forces in northern Iraq.

Where would these ancient aircraft operate from? The US Navy F-18 Super Hornet and Super Growler (the latter providing essential/vital defence suppression for such missions) operate from a US Navy aircraft carrier. These fighters are given extended range by air-to-air refuelling provided by carrier aircraft and/or land-based tankers.

RAF Tornadoes do not enjoy such luxury and, with their excessively short range and endurance, would be a liability if attempting to hit deep strike targets in Kurdistan.

Of course, it is possible to get an RAF Tornado over the Kurdish capital but only with huge logistic ground and air support being deployed and pre-positioned close to the theatre of action. It would also cost a great deal of money compared with an F-18 Super Hornet mission.

You, Secretary of Defence, and your colleagues should be fully aware that our new aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth – with F 35B aircraft embarked would be unable to emulate the F-18 operations from the American carrier.

That is because the carrier has no embarked air-to-air refuelling capability for deep strike missions. And it has no ‘defence suppression’ capability as provided uniquely by the F-18 Super Growler.

These limitations of Britain’s land-based air power projection and the unnecessary limitation of its new supposed strike carriers (enforced by the ramp and the F 35) should now be the central focus of all attention of next year’s Defence Review.

The importance of jobs for British Aerospace Systems workers will pale into electoral insignificance if, and when, Britain is forced to take initial/autonomous action to protect our energy supplies or trade: nearly all of which comes from or passes through the Middle East/East of Suez.

Most sincerely,

Sharkey Ward
N D MacCartan-Ward DSC AFC Cdr RN

Author of SEA HARRIER OVER THE FALKLANDS

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Sea-Harrier-Over-The-Falklands/dp/0304355429